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Abstract. This paper is concerned with the task of ﬁnding majority opinion (MO) in
UK House of Lords (UKHL) case law by analysing agreement statements (AS) that
explicitly express the appointed judges’ acceptance of each other’s reasoning. We
introduce a corpus of 300 UKHL cases in which the relevant AS and MO have been
annotated by three legal experts; and we introduce an AI system that automatically
identiﬁes this AS and MO with a performance comparable to humans.
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1. Introduction
The court of the UK House of Lords (UKHL) is the former judicial arm of the British
parliament’s upper house, which served as the country’s highest appellate court until it
became the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in 2009. In this court, a majority decision (MD)
is an outcome agreed by more than half of the participating judges, while a majority
opinion (MO) is a line of reasoning accepted by more than half as legal grounds for
that decision. The distinction is crucial because an MO sets a binding precedent in UK
law, while a non-majority view is merely persuasive even if it supports an MD. Thus it
is common for UK law lords to discuss their opinions in draft and explicitly state any
agreements with each other in their judgments. Usually this is done through formulaic
phrases, that we call agreement statements (AS), used speciﬁcally for this purpose.
The goal of our work is to develop a computational method for detecting AS in
UKHL judgments and using them to identify cases with a binding MO. This is needed
because legal research tools1 currently offer little help in this respect: since, unlike other
jurisdictions, the obvious instances of dissent which are often ﬂagged up in case digests
are generally insufﬁcient to establish the presence or absence of MO in UKHL cases.
This paper takes the natural ﬁrst step towards a solution by looking for unqualiﬁed (in-
full) AS that sufﬁce (per-se) to imply a deﬁnite (non-contestable) MO.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to introduce a new legal corpus, called ASMO, consisting
of 300 UKHL cases in which relevant AS and implied MO have been annotated by
1See for example westlaw.co.uk , lexisnexis.com/uk/legal , justcite.com and bailii.org/uk/cases/ukhl/
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three legal experts. We derive a consensus labeling for the corpus and determine how
accurately humans perform this task in practice. Our second contribution is to introduce
a novel AI system that uses machine learning (ML) and natural language processing
(NLP) to identify relevant AS and MO with a performance comparable to humans. We
argue this is a useful ﬁrst step towards the development of practical tools to help lawyers
identify legal precedents in UKHL judgments, but we also demonstrate why this task is
far more complex than it might ﬁrst seem.
2. Background
Legal scholars have long discussed [1,2] how the UKHL tradition of publishing seriatim
opinions of individual judges, with no accompanying statement of ofﬁcial consensus on
the underlying reasoning, can make it hard to distinguish a binding MO from a persuasive
MD, even when judges use explicit AS to express their agreements with each other.
In a speech [3] on the ﬁrst anniversary of the UKSC Lady Hale stated while “there
should never be any doubt about what has been decided and why [...] This may not
always be achieved even when we think that we have”. Citing several UKHL & UKSC
cases, she singled out the ongoing failure to solve this as the “low point” of the year.
Our aim is to approach this problem from a computational perspective by automating
the task of detecting unqualiﬁed AS in UKHL judgments and using them to identify
cases where they are sufﬁcient to establish a deﬁnite MO. This can be broken down into
two key tasks which are explained in the following two sub-sections.
2.1. Agreement Statements (AS)
The ﬁrst challenge is to identify those sentences in which the judges actually specify
their agreements with each other. Although a stock of formulaic phrases have evolved
for this purpose, subtle variations in the precise English wording allow judges to express
a myriad range of full or partial agreements - as illustrated in Table 1 below:
1 I fully agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf that this appeal should be dismissed for the
reasons he gives.
2 I agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal.
3 I have read the speeches of my noble and learned friends, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Slynn, and for the
reasons given by Lord Hoffmann, I would dismiss this appeal.
4 Therefore, like Lord Hoffmann, I see no reason in principle why, today, prerogative legislation, too, should
not be subject to judicial review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety.
5 I too would allow the appeal and make the orders my noble friend, Lord Millett, proposes.
6 I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Hoffmann.
7 For these reasons I would allow the appeal and direct that the case be remitted to the County Court for
trial.
8 For these reasons and also for those contained in the opinions of my noble and learned friends Lord Scott
of Foscote and Lord Brown, I agree with the conclusion reached by Langley J and the Court of Appeal
and would dismiss the appeal.
9 I am in full agreement with the reasons expressed in the House today by my noble and learned friends.
Table 1. Example AS, taken from our corpus, representing Full Agreement (1,2,3,8), Partial Agreement (4),
Order Agreement (5), Acknowledgement (3,6), Self Agreement (7,8) and Generic Agreement (9).
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As our aim is to ﬁnd incontestable MO based on full agreements (where one judge
accepts another’s reasoning in its entirety) our ﬁrst priority is to distinguish these from
weaker partial agreements (with just some aspects of the other’s reasoning) or order
agreements (with only the outcomes or orders proposed by the other). For example, in
Table 1, sentence 1 is a full agreement with the reasons for the outcome, but sentence 4 is
a partial agreement with just a part of the reasoning (relating to prerogative legislation),
and sentence 5 is an order agreement with only the outcome and orders (but not the
reasoning).
When considering such agreements a few pitfalls must be avoided. For example,
sentence 2 is a full agreement where the name of the judge being agreed with is not
explicitly contained in the AS, but must be inferred from the relevant pronoun. This is
why we must also consider acknowledgment statements, like sentence 6, which contain
the actual names of the judges referred to. Sentence 3 is a full agreement with one judge
combined with the acknowledgement of another. This shows one sentence may contain
several AS, and not all the judges mentioned are necessarily being agreed with.
It’s worth pointing out the notion of full agreement can be more precisely viewed as
an acceptance that the opinions of some set of judges comprise the binding reasoning of
a case. If a judge believes their own reasoning is indispensable, this can be seen as self
agreement. Although self agreement is often left implicit, judges do frequently refer to
their own reasons explicitly, as shown in sentence 7 - especially when they see them as
a necessary addition to the reasoning of some other judges, as in sentence 8 (which also
includes a partial agreement with a judge in a lower court for good measure).
Finally, it is not uncommon for judges express a full agreement with their learned
friends, but without saying exactly who. As shown in sentence 9, we call these generic
agreements. While this judge is likely agreeing with at least two of his peers, we cannot
be certain which ones. Could it be all the (other) judges, or just those which have posited
arguments of their own, or only those whose arguments are acknowledged by this judge,
or something else? But, although generic agreements are ambiguous, if the other judges
are more explicit, it may still be possible to ﬁnd an MO, as explained below.
2.2. Majority Opinions (MO)
The second challenge is to determine if an MO is implied by the AS. For us, this means
ﬁnding a set of judges whose reasoning is collectively agreed with by more than half the
court. To this end, we ﬁnd it convenient to depict the judges of a case as nodes in a graph,
using arrows to show full agreements (with loops denoting self agreement and ellipses
representing generic agreements) and bold circles to show any judges forming an MO.
As most cases in our corpus have 5 judges, we depict them by the letters A-E. In this
way, we can use the four hypothetical cases shown in Figure 1 below to illustrate some of
the key challenges involved in identifying MO from the AS. In so doing, we will explain
the sort of inferences that a lawyer would make - some of which are necessarily based
on a familiarity with the way that judges actually express themselves in such cases.
In example (i), a 3-of-5 judge majority {B,C,E} establishes {D} as the MO - since
the former all fully agree with the latter’s reasoning. But, while the MO is clear, it is
worth noting we would also be justiﬁed in including D in this majority because the fact
he expresses no full agreement with any other judges implies he must be relying on his
own arguments. Indeed, it happens in practice that one lord writes a stand-alone lead
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Figure 1. Graphs showing three hypothetical cases; where letters denote judges, arrows denote full agreement,
ellipses denote generic agreement, and bold circles show the judges, if any, whose reasoning forms a MO.
judgment which all the other judges agree with. Of course, in this example, since A gives
only a generic agreement, we cannot actually be sure if he shares the majority view (that
the ratio of the case is contained fully in D’s opinion) or if he instead believes some
additional orbiter from B, C, E, or even A himself, are also indispensable. Fortunately,
the MO is not affected by A’s position, as D is already supported by a majority here.
In example (ii), a 3-of-5 judge majority {B,D,E} establishes {A,C} as the MO -
since all the former agree with the reasoning of both the latter. While the MO is again
clear, it is worth noting that neither A nor C are part of the majority electing them as the
MO. For, while each certainly agrees with his own reasoning (as neither provides any
other external grounds for their decision), we can’t assume they agree with each other. It
does happen in practice that two judges explicitly express their mutual agreement with
each other, but when that occurs they will explicitly agree with each other. Even though
that doesn’t happen here, a majority nevertheless does still believe that the arguments in
the opinions of A and B are both needed to adequately justify the decision.
Example (iii) is nearly identical to the previous one, but shows a case where no MO
can be inferred from the AS. The problem is that B and E now form a minority (voting
for both A and C), while C forms another minority (voting for C but not A), which means
there is no majority view. Note that when a judge agrees with the reasoning of two or
more judges, the agreement is with the combined reasoning as opposed to reasoning of
one judge or the other. Therefore, the agreement with reasoning of judges A and C, is
different from agreement with the reasoning of judge A or C. In our example (iii), B and
E are not agreeing with A or C, they agree with both A and C. Crucially, this also shows
the MO cannot be determined by simply ﬁnding nodes with three or more incoming
edges. Example (iv) also demonstrates this point. Here a majority {A,B,C} all agree
with D, who in-turn agrees with E. But, since the reasoning of D relies on E, it follows
they both must be included in the MO which is therefore {D,E}. Note that, as we only
consider full agreements here, A, B and C must implicitly agree with E - since if they
did not then they would not be able to agree with D who clearly does. This is another
illustration of how hard this task can be.
3. Manual Annotation Study
To better understand the practical signiﬁcance of the challenges outlined in the previous
section, we created a corpus of 300 UKHL judgments and asked three experts to identify
the relevant AS and MO in each case. We then used an arbitration process to derive a
J. Valvoda et al. / Using Agreement Statements to Identify Majority Opinion in UKHL Case Law144
consensus annotation for the entire corpus. The following subsections describe how our
corpus, called ASMO2, was constructed, annotated and arbitrated.
3.1. Creating the Corpus
At the outset, we decided a corpus of 300 cases should provide an adequate basis for
reliably training and testing an AI system. But, sourcing such a large number of judg-
ments is not trivial as it would violate the terms-of-service of the legal research tools that
would ordinarily be used to obtain them. Fortunately, UKHL judgments between 1996
and 2009 are publicly available from the UK parliament website3. The only problem
is that cases are split across multiple web pages whose HTML format differs markedly
from year to year. Therefore we created a bespoke web scraper using the BeautifulSoup
library4 which downloads the body of each case, taking into account the yearly format
changes, and combining the text from successive pages into a single ﬁle.
To facilitate the potential future integration of our work with prior work on rhetorical
zoning, we chose to include 69 UKHL cases previously used in the HOLJ corpus of
Hachey et al. [4] in our own corpus. We then randomly selected the remaining 231 cases
from the 755 cases available on the UK parliament website. The resulting ﬁles were
split into individual sentences, with each sentence beginning on a new line. We ﬁrst
used the NLTK toolkit [5] for sentence splitting, but the complexity of a typical sentence
with legal citations and abbreviations led to poor results. We then used the StanfordNLP
toolkit [6] to achieve much better results. Finally, any remaining errors were manually
corrected. In this way we obtained a total of 134,953 sentences in the ASMO corpus.
3.2. Annotating the Corpus
We used three experts to each annotate all 300 cases with relevant AS and MO. We had
two junior annotators (both reading law at university) and a senior annotator (working as
a paralegal in the UK). We provided them with a set of formal guidelines and had them
participate in joint training sessions which explained the two key tasks: to identify which
sentences in a case contain AS representing full agreement or acknowledgement; and to
identify which judges form a conclusive MO based on those AS.
Before engaging the annotators we experimented with the BRAT [7], GATE [8]
and Tagtog [9], annotation tools. But these are optimised for highlighting sub-sentence
structure and not for selecting entire sentences - especially when they span multiple
screen lines (as is usually the case in our corpus where sentences are 29 words long
on average). It soon became clear that just trying to highlight a sentence with these
tools can take longer than working out the correct label. Thus we built our own web-
based annotation tool, which allows users to quickly classify UKHL sentences as full
agreement, acknowledgement or neither and select the names of any judges forming a
MO. Each expert used our tool to annotate all 300 cases over a period of two months.
2The ASMO corpus can be accessed at http://www.holj.ml/asmo where the full text and consensus annota-
tions of all 300 judgements can be seen by simply clicking on the case number (or by following the direct links
embedded in text of this paper discussing speciﬁc examples).
3See https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldjudgmt.htm
4See https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/
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3.3. Arbitrating AS Annotations
In the ﬁrst task, the annotators collectively labelled 2357 sentences as containing AS.
They unanimously agreed on the label of 1671 (71%) of these. Of the other 686, at
least two annotators agreed in all but two instances. A consensus labelling was therefore
obtained by taking the majority view where it existed, or taking the senior annotator’s
view in the few instances where it didn’t. We found three common sources of dispute.
The ﬁrst sort of disagreement concerns the distinction between agreement on the
outcome and agreement on the reasons for the outcome. For example, one annotator
mislabeled the sentence: “In agreement with my noble and learned friend Lord Scott of
Foscote, I too would allow the appeal.”, as a full agreement, when in actual fact it can
only be used to infer agreement with the outcome (since, unlike sentence 1 in Table 1, it
doesn’t actually mention the “reasons”) and so it is only a partial agreement.
The second type of disagreement is on whether a sentence contains an agreement in-
full with reasons leading to an outcome, or only an agreement with some subset of those
reasons. For example in the sentence: “On the basis of the wider approach to the problem
of comparison which my noble and learned friend Lord Slynn of Hadley has adopted
I am in full agreement with him that the rules of procedure for a claim under section
2(4) of the 1970 Act are not less favourable than those which would apply to a claim for
breach of contract in the circumstances of the present cases.”, the agreement is limited
to the interpretation of the 1970 Act. Hence this sentence is also a partial agreement.
The third issue concerns the ambiguous phrasing judges sometimes use to describe
their agreement. For example the sentence: “For these reasons, which really do no more
than echo a part of the altogether fuller reasoning contained in the opinion of my noble
and learned friend Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, which I have had the advantage of
reading in draft and with all of which I am in complete agreement, I too would dismiss
both appeals.” was understood by two experts as a full agreement with Lord Neuberger,
and by one expert as a self agreement of Lady Hale together with a full agreement with
Lord Neuberger. It is hard to say deﬁnitively who is correct in cases like this.
3.4. Arbitrating MO Annotations
In the second task, the experts unanimously agreed in 230 (77%) of the 300 cases. Of
the other 70, at least two annotators agreed in all but six cases. Again, a consensus was
obtained by taking the majority view where it existed, or the senior annotator’s view in
the few cases where it didn’t. This time, the two main sources of dispute came from
differing views about which judges some problematic AS were actually agreeing with,
and from errors made in determining what MO a given set of agreements implied. A
good example is shown by the graph below, depicting the full agreements in case 102:
In this case, one expert inferred {A,B,C} as the MO, presumably because (for the
reasons previously explained in the last sentence of Section 2.2) it seems to be supported
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by all the judges. Now, if C meant to only agree with A and B, then that would indeed
be true. But, given his generic agreement, we can’t rule out the possibility, unlikely as it
might be, that C also meant to agree with D or E - which would then force them into the
MO as well! Since we can’t infer C’s intentions from the AS, we must conclude along
with the other two experts that there is no unambiguous MO in this case.
4. Automated Annotation Study
This section describes our approach to automating the identiﬁcation of MO. To avoid
over-ﬁtting our training data, we randomly split our corpus into three equal subsets of
100 cases, called the AS-set, MO-set and AI-set, that were used in the following three
subsections, respectively . The AS-set was used for the training and testing ourMLmodel
for the sub-task of AS classiﬁcation. The MO-set was used for development and testing
of our rules for the sub-task of MO identiﬁcation. The AI-set was used to evaluate the
complete AI system obtained by combining our ML model for AS classiﬁcation with our
rules for MO identiﬁcation.
4.1. Automating AS Identiﬁcation
We approached the task of AS identiﬁcation as a text classiﬁcation problem. Three com-
monly used ML algorithms, Support Vector Machines (SVM), Logistic Regression (LR)
and Naive Bayes (NB) were trained to classify sentences of our corpus as acknowledge-
ment, full agreement or neither. Each algorithm was evaluated and the F1-score was
used to select the best one. All our experiments were implemented using the scikit-learn
library [10] using 10-fold cross validation.
As we are only interested in a few very speciﬁc sentences from a vast corpus, our
classes are highly imbalanced by nature. To prevent our models simply favouring the
most frequent category of neither (42 525 sentences), we down-sampled the AS-Set, by
randomly selecting sentences to obtain a more balanced training set with 1 292 sentences
in both the none and full agreement categories, and 374 sentences in the acknowledge-
ment category.
Inspired by Hachey et al.’s research on rhetorical zoning [4] and Palau et al.’s re-
search on argumentation mining [11] we take advantage of a combination of traditional
features used for the task of legal text classiﬁcation. These include unigrams, part of
speech tags (POS), sentence lengths, sentence position and named entities (NE). We
also employ custom designed cue phrase feature, inspired by Teufel et al.’s research on
rhetorical zoning [12,13]. Our features are extracted using the NLTK library [5]. The
cue phrases were manually selected by a human annotator based on commonly occurring
phrases in the sentences of interest. They include phrases such as: “for these reasons”,
“allow/dismiss the appeal” or “I have had the advantage”. Some of the words contained
in our cue phrases (e.g. appeal, dismiss, reasons) are already automatically identiﬁed by
the ML algorithms as the most informative unigram features. However, the cue phrases
also capture their word order, making them a valuable feature. Our POS and unigram
features were normalized using term frequency-inverse document frequency (TFIDF).
The best individual feature are unigrams, followed by POS tags, cue phrases, NE,
position and length. The high performance of cue phrases alone suggests AS are indeed
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SVM LR NB
Ind Cum Ind Cum Ind Cum
Unigrams 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.922 0.922
POS tags 0.907 0.938 0.893 0.935 0.851 0.916
Cue phrases 0.800 0.935 0.802 0.939 0.800 0.936
NE 0.490 0.935 0.490 0.942 0.186 0.931
Position 0.342 0.937 0.342 0.943 0.186 0.931
Length 0.282 0.937 0.329 0.943 0.186 0.922
Table 2. ML experiments reporting weighted-average F-scores for 10-fold cross-validation for individual (Ind)
and cumulative (Cum) performance of features.
formulaic. On the other hand, the drop of performance between unigrams and cue phrases
point to the necessity of employing a ML model to achieve F-score of 0.90 and above.
As shown in Table 2 the LR model performs the best, achieving an F-score of 0.943.
It is also the only model able to successfully integrate all of the features (except sentence
length) to cumulatively improve its performance. Based on this we chose to use the the
LR model trained on all features but length in our complete AI system.
4.2. Automating MO Identiﬁcation
Resolving AS to obtain MO consists of two sub-tasks, parsing the AS to build a graph
of the case relations and resolving such graph to identify MO. To build a graph of judge
agreements we parse the AS based on our observations of different types of AS structures
from Section 2.1 Table 1. First however, we remove all sentences with a number in them,
since these can’t be AS and are a result of our ML model misannotation. The number in
a sentence is a proxy for a case citation, indicating an agreement with a past judgment,
or speciﬁcation of a legal point of another judge, indicating only a partial agreement.
We remove all acknowledgements which were not followed by a full agreement, since
they are not necessary for the purpose of anaphora resolution. We remove the parts of the
sentences proposing orders, since orders sometimes contain names of the judges who the
agreement isn’t with. We remove the acknowledging sentences if the names of the judges
in them don’t match the names of judges in full agreement sentences. The remaining AS
sentences of a judgment are merged together. We check an indication of a self-agreement
expressed by phrases such as “For these reasons”. Finally, we extract the names of the
judges. For each case we store the agreements in a dictionary, representing our graph.
To resolve our graph we follow three rules that we believe capture the common infer-
ence patters that we previously explained in Sections 2.2 and 3.4. First we take the tran-
sitive closure of the agreement graph, using the well-known Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
Intuitively this progressively adds implicit agreements from a judge A to any judge C
who is agreed with by any judge B that A already agrees with. Second we take a quali-
ﬁed reﬂexive closure of the resulting graph, which means adding self agreements to any
judges that have no outgoing edges (i.e. who have not expressed a full agreement with
any other judge). Finally we take each judge in turn and see what precise set of judges
they agree with. If any such set has the support of more than half the judges then it is
taken as the MO. Applied on our MO-set, our method ﬁnds (human-identiﬁed) MO from
(human-classiﬁed) AS with 89% accuracy.
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4.3. Complete AI System
We built our full AI system by combining the ML model of Section 4.1 with the rules
of Section 4.2. When tested on the the independent AI-set, our system replicated the
consensus MO with 81% accuracy. By contrast, the average expert agreement with the
consensus MO is 91%, with the lowest being 85%. Hence we claim our system is close
to achieving a human level of performance. It also signiﬁcantly outperforms all obvious
baselines we tested such as saying there isn’t any MO (29%), choosing the single most
cited judge (38%), choosing the judge most mentioned in AS (48%), choosing the set of
judges with opinions longer than some optimal number of sentences (43%), or choosing
the single judge with the most sentences (48%).
4.4. Error Analysis
There are three reasons why we don’t achieve 100% agreement with human annotators.
The ﬁrst cause of error is imperfectly parsed AS caused by an unusual formulation of a
sentence. For example in case 233, the wording “in the manner Lord Hutton proposes”
is used to express an agreement with an order, instead of the traditional expression which
explicitly contains the word “order”, thereby confusing our system. To resolve these
instances in the future, a statistical approach trained on a larger data set could perhaps
learn to correctly identify such unusual expressions of an agreement.
The second cause of error arises when annotators arguably misannotate a case. The
two common sources of annotator error in ASMO corpus are exempliﬁed in Figure 2. The
ﬁrst error arises in instances of complex transitive agreement (e.g. case 90). Our experts
labelled this as having no MO. But we would argue this is incorrect as there are three
judges {C,D,E} all in mutual agreement once we add in the implicit transitive agreement
of E with himself. The second error arises where there are only two agreements with
multiple judges. For example in case 300 the human consensus is that the MO is {B,E},
but we would say there is no MO, as only two judges {A,C} actually agree on this.
Figure 2. Arguably mislabeled cases 90 (left diagram) and 300 (right diagram) from our corpus.
Finally our ML model sometimes misclassiﬁes AS. Since most of our cases have
only 5 judges, a single erroneous agreement in our graph can often result in identifying
the wrong MO. The low error rate we report for our ML model is therefore ampliﬁed on
the task we employ it for. Particularly confusing for our model are partial agreements.
For example the sentence “I also agree with the supplementary observations made by
Lord Walker and by Lord Neuberger in their opinions.” in case 91, contains the word
stems “agree” and “opinion” which our ML model associates with full agreement and
yet the the phrase “supplementary observations” gives away that this agreement is not
with the full reasoning.
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5. Conclusion
Our goal was to develop a computational method for identifying AS and MO in UKHL
case law. To this end we demonstrated the considerable difﬁculties inherent in this task
and we introduced a novel way of approaching these challenges from a graph-theoretic
point of view. We also introduced an extensive expert-annotated ASMO corpus together
with an AI system that is able to automatically identify explicit AS and implied MO with
an accuracy approaching that of humans (81%).
Although we have only been concerned with the identiﬁcation of MO supported by
explicit inter-judge expressions of agreement, this is sufﬁcient to establish the existence
of legally binding MO in over two thirds (71%) of our corpus. Moreover, we believe
the work we have done is a necessary stepping-stone towards the development of more
sophisticated methods that might attempt to resolve the remaining cases through more
nuanced partial agreements between judges and/or appealing to implicit semantic simi-
larities in their legal arguments.
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